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To mark photography's 150th year, the V.U. Museum
of Art is exhibiting this fall, "Nathan Lerner: 50 Years of
Photographic Inquiry." Lerner is an internationally recognized, Chicago-based artist/photographer. His images
have explored perceptions of outer and inner worlds
starting with documents of the Great Depression to lightplay studies when he was teaching at the New
Bauhaus/Institute of design in the late 1930s and 40s, to
form oriented responses to contemporary Japan.
Highlights of his exhibit are presented in this month's
Cresset with an essay by an artist/critic who has known
Lerner since their Institute of Design days.
Front Cover: Nathan Lerner, Closed Eye, Chicago 1940.
Back Cover: Nathan Lerner, Mishima, Tokyo 1978.
The Cresset

IN LUCETUA
Comment by the Editor

President Bush's address on drugs gives plenty of
opportunity for reflection to people who see things in
ethical or religious terms. The actions to which those
people may be led as a result of their reflections can be
expected to be various. Not all will choose to be soldiers in the War Against Drugs.
One surely must ask questions about the
enemy we are being asked to fight. No one could deny
that as a people we are experiencing a group of symptoms that are profoundly disturbing. We hear and read
continually, and certainly President Bush and his drug
czar William Bennett have been vocal in this matter,
about increased crimes, social disruption, violence, and
the like, all carefully labelled "drug-related." There is
no doubt that certain areas of the country are experiencing these symptoms at levels that are intolerable,
and those who are victimized justifiably cry out for
attention and relief. The pain and grief in the voice of
a young girl interviewed on a public radio news
broadcast on the morning after the President's speech
tore at the heart; her mother, her aunts, even her deacon on crack, she herself wanted to die. "But if I do,
who will help my little brother and my little sister?
Who will help them?" Those of us who are in most
senses outside her pain need to fmd ways of alleviating
it, of being her older brothers and sisters.
But, typical of the American penchant for the
quick fix, particularly if it sounds tough, aggressive,
and, even better, militaristic, we are strapping on our
six shooters to go out to war without knowing much
about the enemy, and without thinking about the consequences of our precipitate wars. The government,
and indeed many citizens, want to swing into action
and cut a wide swath through the thickets of our troubles by making lots of new laws, changing the
Constitution if necessary, and putting lots more people
in jail. It's the See bees to the rescue on the sands of yet
another lwo Jima.
But surely many of the symptoms of the
national distress are illegal already. Murder, robbery,
extortion, abuse, threats with menace, harassment-all
these, and all the way down the line through vandalism, operating machinery in an unsafe manner, and
disturbing the peace, to being a "public nuisance."
These actions, all of them considered threats to public
October, 1989

well-being, are punishable in law. All these behaviors
are subject to various prosecutions and punishments,
though admittedly some, like creating a public nuisance, are ambiguous and capable of interpretation. It
seems perfectly reasonable to keep on apprehending,
prosecuting, and punishing persons who commit those
behaviors-for whatever reasons.
What does not seem reasonable is to label as
"criminal" behaviors which sometimes lead to the
crimes listed above, and sometimes do not. To call
people who ingest an illegal substance guilty of breaking the law against such ingestion is reasonable. But to
call them guilty of the murders and mayhem committed by others is not reasonable, and it is not likely to
result in any positive social gain. We will not achieve
general social improvement by attempting to criminalize all behaviors which many of us think can be damaging to the body politic, as well as the body individual.
Didn't we learn that in the experience of Prohibition?
Perhaps the most troubling part of all this is
the problem we human beings have with pleasure. And
in the long history of attempts to understand our
desire for pleasure, and to regulate the behaviors based
on that desire, churches have had relatively little to say.
The general impression seems to be (though this is far
from accurate and far from subtle) that Christianity's
response to the problem of pleasure is "Don't." There
are Biblical verses, often part of Christianity's gnostic
baggage, that can be read that way. But there is not
much explicit "theology of pleasure" in what we
Christians confess. We don't know where, in our systems of values, to put it, especially pleasure experienced in the body. In hymns and liturgy we usually
sing about preferring God to this world's vain pleasures, or about the pleasure of serving God or being in
God's house, but that tends to sum it up.
And what about "drug-induced pleasure"? Is
wine wrong, or coffee, or cigarettes, or chocolate? Do
churches have something sensible and helpful to say
here? If these substances are wrong only to the extent
that they may cause (tricky assumption) some illegal
behavior, then isn't it a logical fault to say that using
them ought to be illegal? Further, if we begin simply
labelling things illegal because we don't like them, and
we don't think they are good for people, all kinds of
3

pleasures may be in trouble, viz. the Mikado's little list.
We might suggest starting with romance novels and
Italian tenors, though doubtless some would be
demur.
The Victorians, in all their admirable zeal for
helping people to be good, got themselves caught in
some situations that ought to look familiar. Those who
have choices among pleasures and who discriminate
among them believe-may even know-that some pleasures are bad. That some goods ought to be encouraged and others discouraged. Thus, because it is good
for people to keep a Sabbath in rest and quietness,
they made laws against games, amusements, entertainments, outdoor eating and drinking, and all selling of
any of these on Sunday. It happened of course that
because of the sixty hour work week, the poor could
only enjoys games and amusements on Sunday, the day
they were forbidden to indulge in them. The
Victorians had to learn that prohibiting pleasures can
be done only with great care, at least in societies that
attempt to regulate civic life with reasonableness and
equity.
Tremendous needs drive the drug business,
legal and illegal. Until we have better things to say
about those needs than "don't have them," we ought
perhaps to cool our hot pursuit of the prosecution of
pleasure.

About This Issue
Generally The Cresset contains a lot of words.
This issue, in contrast, has a lot of pictures. In a year
when photography has everyone's attention, we are
pleased to join in with the Valparaiso University
Museum of Art's observance of the anniversary. The
closed eye on the cover is a provocative image for a
journal of opinion, and demands attention in a peculiar way. When we ask "What does it mean?" the picture steadfastly refuses a simple answer. We spend a
good deal of time, even those of us in the questioning
professions, with our eyes shut Perhaps pictures, like
stories, can help us to see ourselves as we never can
without their help. Richard Maxwell provides a witty
guide to the Goya exhibition most of us will not see,
but nonetheless opens our eyes to the strongly political
and social dimensions, not only of the artist, but of the
curators and collectors and critics who interpret him
for us.
Since our writers often find themselves "farflung," we've asked them to write home about their
travels. Al Trost has obliged with his letter from
Ireland. And closer to home, Bruce Berner takes on
the flag problem as his first contribution as a writer for
"The Nation."
Peace,
GME

Living on Borrowed Time
We begged for summer,
each day a record heat
to dry imported pinon
for the fall. We wanted
autumn long and cold,
frost every dawn
and dark clouds
promising good snow.
Let pears be green
and hard, we'd bake them,
let tight-skinned grapes
be tart, the better
for new wine. As clocks
turned into dusk,
we raked gold leaves
and hired a chimney sweep,
laid in a stack of logs
and waited for the snow.

Walter McDonald
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Richard Maxwell

WHAT MAKES FRANCISCO RUN?
The exhibition "Goya and the Spirit of Enlightenment," which has been on an extended tour this year
(Boston, New York, Madrid), includes many of the
painter's most bizarre productions: there are gory
fantasies of witchcraft, allegorical tableaux so
grotesque as to spook the most settled onlooker,
depictions of the disgusting or laughable people who
(to a considerable extent) dominated successive generations of the Spanish monarchy. This is the Goya
whom the modern world expects, perhaps, too readily;
to quote the title of the artist's most famous etching,
The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters. In other words,
human critical faculties prove helpless against-or even
exacerbate-the irresistible nightmares of society and
history. We live with evil in a helpless daze.
Everybody knows the morbid Goya. His existence has been confirmed again and again by a succession of brilliant commentaries over the last two centuries. The present exhibit goes against received opinion by presenting the anticipated Goyesque nightmares within a framework of reason, illumination, and
enlightenment. Scholarly articles have long established Goya's connection with certain Enlightenment
figures and ideas. The curators of this show, Alfonso
E. Perez sanchez and Eleanor A. Sayre, go a big step
further; they want to demonstrate that Goya is a fullfledged liberal, committed to those (largely) French
ideas which were, in his time, turning the world
upside-down.
I saw "Goya and the Spirit of Enlightenment"
at the Metropolitan Museum, where it was hung in a
series of spacious, uncluttered rooms to suggest the
history of Spain during the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries. The country had a rough time
in these years. Carlos III was progressive and competent; his successor, Carlos IV, gave over governance to
unscrupulous advisors; claiming power after several
years in exile (during which Napoleonic puppets dominated the country), Ferdinand VII proved a tyrant
and a booby. This sequence suggests bad luck in
kings; it also suggests a problem which often comes up
when elites try to reform backward countries. Every
step towards modern civil procedures creates a reactionary backlash. Rulers not only shape but are also

Richard Maxwell, interim editor for The Cresset during
1989, writes often on film and art. A specialist in 19th century aesthetics, he publishes on Dickens and Hugo.
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shaped by this tendency.
One highlight of the exhibition was a group of
portraits featuring some leading figures in the Spanish
Enlightenment. Most students of this period are familiar with Goya's likenesses of idiotic or mean figures at
the court, and those have their place here: there are
two ghastly Ferdinand VIIs, an overfed Manuel Godoy
(the so-called "Prince of Peace," lover of Carlos IV's
queen and a major power at court), as well as a few
other items in the same spirit. But the spotlight is on
some less often-seen images, from locations like Parma,
the Bank of Spain or (most tantalizingly) "private collection." For instance, the show begins with Mengs's
portrait (1761) of a beaming Carlos III; then, a few
yards away, the viewer can turn to Goya's 1783 portrait
of the Conde de Floridablanca, Carlos's prime minister.
This was one of the artist's first commissions, a crucial
work in his career.
Goya depicts Floridablanca as the very model
of a modern major bureaucrat. He stands, stage center, in a draped, rather dark state apartment, looking
head-on at the viewer. He is dressed in a wonderful
outfit, red jacket and breeches, white and gold waistcoat, blue sash, with a simply-dressed wig. (So: a touch
of splendor, moderated by austerity.) To his left is the
young Goya, exhibiting a canvas-perhaps a preliminary
sketch of the picture we are looking at; at his right is a
splendid clock, suggesting authority and efficiency
both, and below it papers mapping one of Floridablanca's most important public works, the Aragonese
Canal. In the upper right corner hangs an oval portrait of Carlos, repeating the image familiar from
Mengs. Is that a watch Floridablanca holds, or a pair of
spectacles? In either case, the gesture encapsulates a
kind of administrative heroism. This man projects
enormous energy and confidence; he depends on a
shaky system of court favoritism, within which the exercise of reason is a demanding, risky activity. The role
of bureaucrat is larger here, more admirable and significant, than in the cliched accounts of most modern
literature and art. An historical postscript: Godoy
made sure that Floridablanca spent most of his later
years in exile. He died shortly after a short return to
power, in 1808.
"Goya and the Spirit of Enlightenment" features a generous selection of single and group portraits
on this level of accomplishment-the family of Infante
Don Luis (an outstanding multiple portrait, respecting
differences among individuals, from a self-conscious
hairdresser to a beaming courtier in a strange bandage5

cap, but organized around a dominant personality:
There is much more to say about Gaya Attended
Dona Teresa de Vallabriga), the Condesa-duquesa de
by Doctor Arrieta-about its combination of religious
Benavente (wearing her extravagant ribboned hat
iconography with a tribute to the everyday practice of
suavely: a woman of the world), the banker Francisco
science, about its extraordinary color scheme, about its
de Cabarrus (proponent of universal education; paintrelation to the traditional form of the emblem (Goya
ed starkly, the single actor in his own uncluttered
writes the plot of the painting beneath it, against a
space). Not least, there are three self-portraits, the ftrst
burnished orange band, thus adapting a standard
from the artist's youth, the second from the 1790s
emblematic technique), perhaps most intriguingly
(about twenty years latabout its relation with
er), the third from his
The Sleep of Reason Proold age. It is the latter,
duces Monsters, to which
normally on display at
the Arrieta is a kind of
the Minneapolis Instidelayed counter-blast.
tute of Arts, that has
(In Sleep, the artist loses
drawn the most attencontrol, the owl of Mintion.
erva is transformed into
While its predea creature of terror; in
cessors present Goya as,
Arrieta, reason wakes up
respectively, a sensitive
a protagonist who is
about to yield to unconnovice and a feisty techsciousness and its
nician, the Minneapolis
picture shows a man
demons.)
Through
recently recovered from
these and other means,
death. We see head-on,
Arrieta confirms, while
in a foreshortened view
deepening, the thesis
whose physical impossiadvanced by Sayre,
Sanchez and their colbility somehow adds to
the composition's effeclaborators. Within the
context provided by
tiveness, the bed-ridden
such images, the claim
artist supported from
that Goya could resist
behind by his doctor
and friend Arrieta, who
his own nightmares and
offers him a glass of a
the nightmares of his
red-tinted medicine:
time instead of simply
the red echoes that of
yielding to them gains
the blanket drawn up to
considerable strength.
It's not out of line
the artist's waist. Goya
to suppose that the preis ashen-faced, seemingsent show might shift
ly on the edge of unconGaya Attended by Doctor Arrieta, 1820
the general, educated
sciousness; the doctor is
steady, intent on drawing his patient back from his sickperception of Goya. On the other hand, the shift will
ness. Behind them is a row of what appear to be classinot occur without a struggle-a struggle whose ftrst
cal busts: the one on the far right, just behind Goya's
stage occurred this spring and summer. Two of the
most widely circulated essays on the Sanchez/Sayre
shoulder, could almost be a skull. These solemn heads
loom out of a darkness which makes it impossible to
exhibition were those by Jonathan Brown (The New
Republic, 15 May) and Robert Hughes (The New York
say how they are supported or what their ontological
Review of Books, 29 June). Brown and Hughes present
status might be. Equally ambiguous is their relation to
the painting's two chief characters-but (for me) the
two main claims, each intended to chip away at the
plausibility of associating Goya with the Enlightenoverall point is unmistakable. The doctor could not
ment, or with the critical exercise of reason. (1) Goya
more effectively embody the best of those Enlightenwas quite the careerist-a sort of art-historical Sammy
ment virtues advocated by Floridablanca and others,
Glick-and thus his commitment to such ideas as
only now the lesson has been taken to heart: Arrieta's
calm professional sanity is identified with the basis of
progress cannot be taken very seriously. (2) No one
physical and mental health.
who understood the evils of the world as well as he
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could possibly be called a "liberal" or a "rationalist."
should note that the matter of Goya's pessimism is
From these two arguments follows a decided conclutreated with equal superficiality, especially by Brown.
sion. Far from embodying the hopes of the EnlightenHe writes of the year 1812 (after the Napoleonic invament, Goya remains the adherent of romantic nihilism
sion of Spain), "This was also the period when Goya
etched the first section of the Disasters of War, his stirwe all know and love. This exhibition has therefore
created a painter in its own image, as have, in various
ring indictment of the tragic consequences of taking
other ways, successive generations of interpreters.
political struggles to the battlefield. The relationship
The case is argued at great length; it deserves a
of the Disasters to contemporary events is self-evident.
I doubt, though, that
refutation. I will take
their
horrendous
up the two main arguimagery should be
ments in order. Hughes
understood as an
is especially intent on
'appeal to reason.' " I
establishing that Goya
recommend to Brown a
would paint anybody,
close reading of Paul
even the despicable
Fussell's essay, "The
Godoy, so long as he
Real War, 1939-1945,"
could thereby further
in the August 1989
his career. FurtherAtlantic. Fussell conmore, he goes out of his
trasts the straightforway to suggest that Goya
ward understanding of
presents people the way
what happens in war
they want to be seen,
communicated by, say,
without any critical
the Bayeux Tapestry or
stance at all. Even
Henry V (neither of
Godoy: "He may look to
which
could
be
us like the prototype of
described as pacifist)
every Latin American
with the "popular and
dictator that ever divertgenteel iconography of
ed foreign aid from
war during the bourWashington to anumgeois age." Most recentbered
account
in
ly: "The peruser (readSwitzerland, but there is
er would be the wrong
no mistaking Goya's
word) of the picture
obsequiousness." Since
collection Life Goes to
Goya juxtaposes Godoy
War ( 1977). . .will find
with a (literal) horse's
even in its starkest
ass-not a common gesimages no depiction of
ture in military/heroic
bodies dismembered."
portraits-Hughes's quesThe Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters, 1799
As Fussell observes, Goya
tion-begging assertion
is an exception; indeed he is one of the few eighteenth
stretches a point somewhat thinly. Similarly, Hughes
writes (of a picture not in the show): "it may even be
or nineteenth-century artists to circumvent "popular
that Charles [IV] and Maria Luisa were so much uglier
and genteel" war iconography. Far from a pathological
in real life that Goya's portraits of them are a positive
indulgence, the Disasters of War can be understood as a
act of charity." This speculation takes us into neverstubborn manifestation of a long tradition, a tradition
never land. A look at Goya's portrait of the royal famiabout to be challenged by the all-enveloping power of
ly, to which Hughes is referring, brings us right back: if
public relations and collective mystification.
The Brown and Hughes essays are characterthere was ever a picture which suggested a breakdown
in codes of royal authority and relations between
ized throughout by argument at once picky and sloppy:
patron and artist, this is the one. Hughes has chosen
each writer goes out of his way to edge around rather
than into the difficulties of the case. Since neither critto finesse his way through the question of Goya's sinic is usually so obtuse, I seek a reason beyond the local
cerity, a troubling matter not to be disposed of with
occasion of the Goya exhibit for such patently awkward
such cavalier ease.
I will return to this problem below, but first I
performances. One prominent stumbling-block is that
October, 1989
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now overloaded word, "liberal." No one in this country could fail to remember George Bush's use of "liberal" in the last election or Michael Dukakis's chickenhearted flight from it. "Liberal" is a term whose modern usage begins in Spain at the time of the Peninsular
War; possibly the term has come to the end of its
career, except as an insult, but before this perhaps necessary demise it might be just as well to reconsider its
history and connotations. To my mind, Brown and
Hughes make roughly the same mistake as Dukakis,
and less excusably; that is, they accept an implicitly
derogatory defmition of liberalism, as associated with
the Enlightenment and with reason, then do their best
to show that they know better as obviously did the
painter who is their subject. A liberal, on the definition implied by these critics, is one who functions
according to impossibly idealistic expectations, both of
himself and of others. Therefore (recurring to topics
discussed above), anyone who displays wartime atrocities realistically is not a liberal, nor could any court
artist, enmeshed in the rituals of flattery, be so
described. Liberals must be pure; they cannot make
compromises. Liberals must have their heads in the
clouds; Goya moved through a less elevated murk.
Brown and Hughes are not the first to work
with the self-cancelling conception of liberalism I have
just sketched out. Writing out for his students an Introduction to Romance Languages and Literature, Erich Auerbach noted of Diderot that he was "too easily moved to
optimism and enthusiasm to see the real grandeur and
misery of our life"-yet it is the same Enlightenment figure who conceived Rameau's Nephew, a dialogue
between the optimistic philosophe and a less confident Diderot altogether. (A similar dialogue goes on
within Goya: once again, the contrast between Sleep
and Arrieta suggests its extent and subtlety.) There's a
revealing echo of this approach even in the best
extended review of "Goya and the Spirit of Enlightenment," Adam Gopnik's.
Exploring Goya's place in
Western culture, Gopnik writes, "The ideal of reason
celebrated in David and in Diderot-clear purpose,
expressed in purified form-is far from the tragic ideal
of reason that moved Burke and Voltaire." (The New
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Yorlter,June 19. This essay is worth looking up, especially for its comments on the Arrieta picture, on clothes
in society portraits, and most generally, on Goya's fascination with surfaces.)
I'm amazed by the need Gopnik feels to sneak
Burke in with Voltaire; of all the great eighteenth-century philosophers, the former is probably the furthest
from sympathy with the Enlightenment or with the critical exercise of reason. His presence in Gopnik's sentence suggests more a cultural obeisance to the 1980s
and its peculiar political confusions than it does an
approach to Goya. Realism must be seen as conservative and tragic. Voltaire (or Goya) is along for the ride;
he may consider himself lucky.
Finally, a memory and a moral. My first
acquaintance with Goya came on the beaches of Malibu, where, one afternoon during the summer of 1959,
I watched the image of a gigantic unclothed woman
towed across the sky. Above her were written the words
The Nalted Maja; she was an advertisement for a film
and-though I didn't know it-a reproduction of a painting. The reproduction was effective (far more so than
the film, I am told); however, it was the whole situation
that best caught the spirit of the artist, whose paintings,
etchings and drawings include so many depictions of
flight reimagined as folly. Retrospectively, I am tempted to inscribe this excellent California beach scene
with a little commentary (as though it were one of Goya's satirical-visionary engravings): "Where is this infernal contraption going, filling the air with smoke and
the mind of surfers with wonder? The author suspects
that to rise is to fall, but he also has another reminder
for his readers. He who depicts this airborne monstrosity is not necessarily he who rides it." It is advice
along these lines that I would offer to the critics of the
Goya show: they have mixed up the painter with some
of his less edifying creations; they have skewed-quite
unnecessarily-the history of liberal thought and its
relation to the history of images in our culture.

000
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Charles Vandersee

DRIFTING TOWARD GREATNESS
Only Manhattan has the great Strand Bookstore,
with tables full of current books at half price, things
you really want (often untouched review copies).
What the town of Dogwood has are bookstores that
put out aged remainders. So you drive an hour west,
across the Blue Ridge and then north, until you reach
Mount Crawford and the Green Valley auction barn.
Four times a year, on two successive weekends,
this big barn off a dusty farm road turns into a crowded book fair for readers up and down the Shenandoah
Valley. Local people, apparently (I've never inquired),
truck in thousands of current books from dozens of
major publishers, either overstock or minutely damaged. A "damaged" paperback might have only a
small tear in the cover, but the price goes down from,
say, $7.95 to $2. With each visit you pick up a half
dozen recent novels that look promising, feeling fiscally more virtuous the heavier your arm gets.
I've found there the stories of Andre Dubus,
Anne Tyler's The Accidental Tourist, Shirley Hazzard's
The Transit of Venus-fiction I may have noticed in the
New York Times Book Review at publication time but
instantly forgot. There I also encountered Russell
Banks's novel Continental Drift.
The blurbs (by poet Dave Smith and novelists
Joyce Carol Oates and John Edgar Wideman) did not
so much entice me as did one of the two epigraphs, by
Wallace Stevens. For a fiction writer to start out by
quoting Stevens, a poet's poet, is irresistibly provocative. Besides which, Stevens is the American poet of
the twentieth century whom I most care for. But even
thus prompted, I'm not likely to buy a new novel, even
at $2, unless there's something enticing about the
prose. Continental Drift opens with these remarkable
lines:
It's not memory you need for telling this story, the sad story
of Robert Raymond Dubois, the story that ends along the
back streets and alleys of Miami, Florida, on a February
morning in 1981, that begins way to the north in Catamount, New Hampshire, on a cold, snow-flecked afternoon

Author Charles Vandersee usually writes a letter from
Dogwood. This essay results from the encouragement, perhaps
even the persistent demand, of interim editor, Richard
Maxwell. The second part of this review will appear in the
December Cresset.
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in December 1979, the story that tells what happened to
young Bob Dubois in the months between the wintry afternoon in New Hampshire and the dark, wet morning in Florida and tells what happened to the several people who loved
him and to some Haitian people and a Jamaican and to Bob's
older brother Eddie Dubois who loved him but thought he
did not and to Bob's best friend Avery Boone who did not
love him but thought he did and to the women who were
loved by Bob Dubois nearly as much and as differently from
the way he loved his wife Elaine. It's not memory you need,
it's clear-eyed pity and hot, old-time anger and a Northern
man's love of the sun, it's a white Christian man's entwined
obsession with race and sex and a proper middle-class American's shame for his nation's history. This is an American
story of the late twentieth century, and you don't need a
muse to tell it, you need something more like a loa, or
mouth-man, a voice that makes speech stand in front of you
and not behind .... Let Legba come forward, then, come
forward and bring this middle-aging white mouth-man [Russell Banks] into speech again ...
Here was a brash voice, terribly self-assured
(even oracular), maybe hysterical-not boding well. But
interesting: taking risks, an activity not common these
days. The risk of giving away in advance much information about the story; the blatant assertions about big
stuff, love and anger and pity and history; the cryptic
summoning of an unheard-of kind of inspirer or voicegiver, a loa named Legba.

I bought this book on April 16, 1988; it had
been published in 1985 by Harper & Row. Of it, I
knew nothing; of the author, nothing until noticing his
birth year ( 1940) with the copyright notice; of his
other seven books nothing except their titles listed in
the front matter. Within a few months I read this book
three times, for three different reasons. What I now
wish to do is to make some rather large claims for it. In
so doing, also make some comments about why we
read novels in the late twentieth century, and perhaps
also raise the question of who "we" are.
Claims arise from merit, I will obviously be
arguing, but important also is the fact that Russell
Banks's newest novel, Affliction, was published last
month, September 1989. Reading it in June, for a
short notice elsewhere, I judged it to be less ambitious
and successful than Continental Drift; a few comments
later about this new novel (an alternate selection of the
Book-of-the-Month Club) may make clearer the accomplishments of the earlier one.
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II

My first reading of Continental Drift, soon after
purchase, knowing nothing of Banks or his work, was
not an innocent or pure reading. For a "professional
reader," innocence is not possible. I teach and have
taught novels for many years, especially those that fall
into a category: American novels. More precisely,
North American novels. Professional readers know
something about the behavior of such books; many
canonical North American novels are by or about
young sensitive white males-Ishmael, Huck Finn,
Christopher Newman, Henry Fleming, George Willard,
Nick Carraway, Jake Barnes, Martin Arrowsmith, Holden Caulfield, Augie March (in novels such as Molly-Dick,
The American, The Red Badge of Courage, Winesburg, Ohio,
The Great Gatslly, The Sun Also Rises, The Catcher in the
Rye.)
In Continental Drift appeared Robert Dubois,
age 30, a New Hampshire oil burner repairman. Here
was a new character in the long and honorable and
interesting line of Young Sensitive White Males: men
or boys uncomfortable at home, also not equipped to
tackle the world, unwilling to be tied down, generally
cursed with ideals. In what ways, I asked, might this latest figure capture my attention?
A question apparently. "innocent" but not really. In fact, impatience and skepticism. Can this Russell
Banks person really meet the YSWM challenge? It was
essential, that is, that Banks know the tradition; "we"
cannot accept innocence in serious authors, even as we
know "we" as readers lack innocence. Banks sounded
plenty serious in that opening oration; did he know the
hurdles on the track-the tradition-well enough to surmount them gracefully and in good time? I wondered;
the need of "shame" for American history sounded
shrill and glib, though tradition has licensed the YSWM
to be hypercritical, whether as character or author.
Still, you could call my first reading of Continental Drift comparatively innocent, a pleasure trip. On
the YSWM question he might venture nothing new, but
he might still triumph in form, in language, in calm
human intelligence, in action and passion, in local
color, in rendering of subordinate characters. "We,"
that is, still read novels to find a thing shaped well,
made well, enriched, animated.
The novel turned out to be a tour de force in
two notable ways. First, that loa actually worked, solved
a major problem in a truly fascinating way. The problem, also tackled by such American experimenters as
10

Henry James and John Dos Passos, has to do with
where the narrator places himself in relation to his
story: on one end of the spectrum he can be invisible,
on the other end, intrusive. Choosing to be invisible,
you dramatize, you present-and you tend to sacrifice
your own views on the characters and actions. In
choosing to be intrusive, you not only risk "preaching"
but you divide the reader's attention between yourself
and your story, and your story may suffer a loss of
power and impact.
Dos Passos' brilliant stroke in the 1930s, in
U.S.A., was virtually to reject the spectrum. In a breezy,
slangy Middle American voice he put forth his characters, but then to comment on them and their times he
found newspaper headlines, lines from popular songs,
and slogans of the day (extraneous material, in short),
which he inserted here and there. Banks, with his loa,
also rejects the spectrum; as he later explained in an
interview, he had once found in a Jamaican village a
native chief who had a "mouth-man," "sort of like our
presidential press secretary." "I loved the idea. I
thought, now that's what I want; I want a mouth-man. I
want to be sort of dim and shy in the background and
yet have someone out there in the page taking responsibility for the story."
I later found this mouth-man in Banks's 1980
novel, The Book ofjamaica (another YSWM story), where
Harris, in a remote native tribe, is depicted as the
"strange, intense" spokesman for the chief, in the "Obi"
section of the book. Meanwhile, as Banks has
explained:
With Continental Drift I said, OK, I'll invoke a narrator the
way you invoke a loa in Haitian Voudon. Which is to say, I'll
allow myself, if I can, to be in a sense possessed; I'll let this
voice speak through me, and it'll be of a specific characterthe loa will be Legba, who has the specific character of pr~
tector of children, guardian of the crossroads, figure that sees
backward and forward in time ....
So that in a few places in the novel the narrator, emboldened by Legba, stands well back from the
characters and performs feats that in his own unaided
American voice would be-well, a little strange. He ventures, that is, some spectacular analogies and hypotheses:
It's as if the creatures residing on this planet in
these years,the human creatures, millions of them traveling
singly and in families, in clans and in tribes, traveling sometimes as entire nations, were a subsystem inside the larger system of currents and tides, of winds and weather, of drifting
continents and shifting, uplifting, grinding, cracking land
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masses. It's as if the poor forked creatures who walk, sail and
ride on donkeys and camels, in trucks, buses and trains from
one spot on the earth to another were all responding to
unseen, natural forces ... .
That is part of a section which will introduce certain
individual Haitian refugees-seen, as it were, first from
the vantage point of the cosmos and only then the vantage point of a human observer, c~mpelled to .depi.ct
(in detail) the squalor and subservience of their eXIs-tence. You can call this cosmic vision a sort of jejune
indulgence, an over-reaching that twentieth-century
narrators are not supposed to attempt. But by ascribing it to Legba's inspiration you may feel its power to
extend the imagination beyond American limits.
There is a vast region of uncertainty as to what analogies between physical forces and human behavior are
sound ones; my suggestion is that the imagination feels
itself stretching when entertaining such analogies,
regardless of how "true" they are.
And that such stretching is a good thing. In
the proper pace of reading, I argue, we do not stand
up and object that Banks has reinvented the megaphone, the omniscient narrator, but instead say. (s~b
liminally) to ourselves: "There's that loa explammg
things again; yes, we were ready for that commentary;
yes, he may well have it right."
ill

The second way in which Continental Drift
seemed to me a tour de force has to do with knowledge. For long stretches, Banks had c.hosen to .l~ave
the U.S.A., in this "American story," gomg to Haiti, to
North Caicos Island, and then to the Bahamas, to render convincingly the inner and outer experiences of
desperate islanders paying huge sums to skippers
promising to drop them on a Florida beach. Rende~
ing of a wholly different culture is vastly . more a~bi
tious than depicting yet another hermetic Amencan
small town or alcoholic suburb. I was impressed. A
professional reader, skeptical, impatient, is likely to be
impressed by ambition.
In fact, during the second reading, four
months later (to confirm in my mind that I wanted to
use it for class), something curious happened, making
me more aware of Banks's impressive knowledge.
Infrequently I pick up the Richmond News-uader, not
for its arrogantly reactionary editorial page but to see
what's going on in and around the capital. In earl:
August, what was going on, explained a three-part article, was the Yoruba religion, from Africa. I saw the
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name of Elegba, deity, who appeared in Continental
Drift as "Papa Legba," one of the figures prayed to i~
Haitian rites, and of course our loa. I read about sacnfices of goats and chickens, and other rituals, all. in ~nd
around Richmond, Virginia, one of them at midmght
in the cemetery of St. Matthew Lutheran Church.
These were the same rites the Haitians had brought
from Africa and taken to Miami, in Banks's novel. Yoruba was thriving in Richmond and other American
places, to my surprise-though in America, wh~n it
comes to variegated religion, nothing should surpnse.
I was impressed. The newspaper articles
seemed to confirm the accuracy of Banks's depiction,
the rituals and the officiants. He obviously knew a
great deal, more than I had stopped to think about.
Accuracy about voodoo in the Caribbean meant that
probably he had also troubled himself to . find o~t
about Haitian life in the U.S., as he takes us mto therr
forty-block area near the 1-95 expressway in northeast
Miami. Our new America consists not only of wellreported Cubans and Vietnamese and Puerto Ricans
but also Jamaicans and Haitians-and Anglos much
interested, commercially, in drugs. The very story of
America is always the newest group, ethnic or commercial, and how it changes itself and us. A profes~ional
reader encountering calm intelligence and new mformation is impressed, particularly when the novelist h~s
chosen big and important topics as integral parts of his
story.
What unites the Haitians and the Dubois family
is the fact that all are headed for a "new life"-the essential American theme-in Florida. Florida in the late
twentieth century is what the American West used to
be: the place where everything will be better. But if
united by desire, the two groups are importantly ~i~fer
entiated when it comes to sustenance. The Haitians
have religion and its provision for community, the
Dubois family doesn't. Here is part of the "drift" of the
title, the novel unobtrusively commenting on the drift
away from the hope and the sense of belon~i~g which
religion and ethnicity provide-any of the rehg10ns and
nations that have landed in America with a first generation of boat people.
We will all plug in our historical knowledge at
this point-Bay Colony Puritans and their religion, the
Boston Irish, the Lower East Side Jews, the Pennsylvania German Lutherans-as we recall the waning of fervor that has often accompanied acculturation in America. You gradually belonged to "America," leaving your
shtetl or your chapel, and the increasing size and
spread of America left you unsure what ties of suste11

nance and obligation could be acquired in mere
(huge) national affiliation.
So that Bob Dubois, French Canadian in
ancestry, "goes occasionally to mass with his wife and
children and believes in God the way he believes in
politicians-he knows He exists but doesn't depend on
Him for anything" (the loa conveniently inspiring
these summary characterizations). In sharp contrast to
Dubois' inert faith is the frenzied ritual experienced by
Vanise, the one survivor of the Haitians forced to jump
from Bob's boat when intercepted by the Coast Guard.
She has to be brought "back to the land of the living,"
this young woman who has been raped repeatedly
since leaving her home island, has lost her child, and
has nearly drowned. At the ceremony in an abandoned Miami warehouse the drums beat furiously, the
priest "reaches into her mouth and draws out her
tongue"; there is chanting, dancing, the bloody execution of a chicken over her bare legs, cooking and
singing.
IV

Ambition, then, in gaining knowledge about
the new and exotic in America, and its connection with
the older America. Ambition in voice and in narrative
strategy. Also, alertness to one central-indeed, constituting--theme in America, the ever-changing immigrant patterns. And attention to a basic human question, religion, the possible consequences of its presence or absence on the health and the capacity for survival of the particular individuals under examination.
These, I thought to myself, are several of the large
claims that "we" should be examining in Continental
Drift, as I went to it for the third time, reading it just
ahead of the class, in November, and deciding what to
emphasize.
But pause for a moment. In advancing claims,
I am thinking of three kinds of "we," and these need to
be explained. Because even though one of these kinds
makes the largest claim, it is important to see where
the other two come in.
NovelistJohn Barth observes that "most people read novels for entertainment and delight." And,
he adds, "most novels are read only once." That might
describe the Book-of-the-Month Club reader. "We" as
professional readers recognize ourselves in the first
sentence, but not in the second. Like BOMC readers,
we come for entertainment (if not for "sheer" entertainment) and for delight (if not for "escape")-the
professional reader does have a soul, or facsimile, even
12

a heart, sometimes tearducts. At the climactic moment
when Bob Dubois' unhappy life fmally collapses, plunging him beneath the realm of humanity, we have seen
him move-in credible stages-from bored repairman to
frightened liquor store manager to captain of a fishing
vessel used for illegal immigration. Spotted by a Coast
Guard cutter, he and his Jamaican crewman will be
jailed if caught with their human cargo:
[T]heJamaican is now bodily hurling the Haitians into the
sea one after the other, the old man, the woman with the two
sm~ll children, Vanise and her child, the old woman. He's
clearing the deck of them. They weep and cry out for help
from God, from the loas, from Bob, who looks on in horror,
and then they are gone, lifted up by the dark waves and carried away toward the shore.
It is a terrible moment, and "we" can and do respond.
There is, however, a second type of "we," apt to
call this scene "lurid" or "gratuitous" or "melodramatic," even though the BOMC reader and the professional reader unite in feeling it controlled, plausible, even
inevitable. This second type of reader is the book
reviewer, particularly in a medium such as the New York
Times Book Review. The reviewer reports in a formulaic
way, beginning with two or three paragraphs reminding (or telling) us about the novelist's earlier work. We
take for granted that the reviewer (a) is interested in
this particular novelist, (b) has just dutifully reread several of the novelist's major previous books, (c) is determined to render an evaluation of the new novel in
terms of a continuum established by the novelist's previous works.
And in that continuum repetition will stand
out. Has any reviewer, for example, in the last few
years, not commented on the "preoccupation with violence" in the novels of Joyce Carol Oates? Repetition
rather than "rightness" seems to command the reviewer's attention. True, the aggregation of violence in
Oates's oeuvre, or even within a given novel, is interesting from a synoptic or statistical point of view, but it
does not really help us understand whether instances
in a particular novel are appropriate or gratuitous.
The third type of "we" is of course the professional reader; "we" are in part the BOMC reader (seeking pleasure) and also the reviewer (seeking continuum), but we think, fmally, of ourselves as seeking something else besides an evening's gratification or the repetitions and advances in a career. We are always and
chiefly engaged in one central issue: What Is Going
On In The Novel These Days?
The Cresset

This is not unlike a large-minded novelist asking the question of what is going on in America these
days. It is like the professional political scientist (not
the average network 1V commentator) asking what is
going on with the American judicial system these days.
Or the informed observer of a new building judging
not only esthetics and function but asking what this
building tells us about architecture these days. We
always wish to study the single achievement, but more
than that we wish to know, to know what is going on in
a particular craft. Particularly we wish to see new ways
of solving old problems, and we wish to see evidence
that imagination has not died .

Neither one casual reading of a single novel
nor reading of a novel in terms of the novelist's career
can situate a reader for making one large claim for a
book: that this book tells us news about its genre and
about the human imagination.
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Robert Kostka

NATHAN LERNER:
THE RE-INVENTING ARTIST
Artists can have any of a
wide range of talents and gifts. Some
create their art with surprisingly few
talents but with a lot of hard work.
Others have only the gift of self-promotion. One of the rarest of all tal-

Robert Kostka is a painter, graphic
designer, teacher, and art critic.

ents is the ability to keep renewing
one's art, to re-invent oneself over
and over as an artist, to keep growing as an aware human being.
Nathan Lerner is one of
those rare artists.
Born in Chicago in 1913, he
has traveled the world, but Chicago
is still "his city." He studied to be a

post-Impressionist painter, but photography seemed to come naturally.
His first photographs in the exhibit
date from 1932, when he was nineteen. By 1935 he had taken one of
his most famous photographs, The
Swimmer. Photographed from
above, the swimmer appears to be
diving through space itself. The

Uncommon Man, Chicago 1936
October; 1989
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Beautiful Girl, Chicago 1936
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light reflections on the water's surface become flames, and we are
aware of archetypal man moving
through the unity of opposites-fire
and water.
The hard reality of that time was
the Great Depression, its social and
economic upheaval, and the camera
seemed ideally suited for documenting and communicating the human
despair that characterized the age .
Nevertheless, as
Lerner has

remarked, there was a spirit of compassion, of "everyone being in it
together" that is missing from our current social crises. Epitomizing the era
are his photographs of the Maxwell
Street area, a colorful open air market
now almost totally gone.
During this time Maxwell
Street was a melting-pot of races and
nationalities, a mixture of vendors,
push-carts, gypsy fortune-tellers, new
and used objects of all sorts, as well as

food prepared on the spot. Over 300
photographs reaffirm the sadness and
hope, the simple humanity that marks
survivors. As a photographer, Lerner
evoked interactions and open acceptance with his subjects, an achievement that was possible then, before
today's suspicious fear of the documentary photographer. The 1936
photograph Beautiful Girl shows such·
trust and acceptance clearly, as does
the wit of Uncommon Man, a chipped

Cakes in Window, New York 1943
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plaster bust of Lincoln placed in an
open car, as a passenger. Lerner is
no disinterested observer.
In an unprecedented period of enrichment, World War II
brought the best minds from
Europe to this country, with a corresponding impact on every art form,
on science, philosophy, medicine,
and literature, as well as education.
Based on the principles and techniques of the German Bauhaus, a

new kind of school opened in Chicago headed by Moholy-Nagy. While
most art schools were still drawing
from plaster casts, the New Bauhaus
students were exploring all the senses, the role of life itself in the growth
of form. No difference was made
between the "fine arts" and the
design of communication, everyday
objects, low-cost housing, made available to all by making use of industrial
techniques. It may be difficult for

students today-when the current
fashion in study seems to be Avarice
101-to understand the kind of idealism that characterized the New
Bauhaus students and faculty.
Lerner began exploring
product design, and his photography took an important new experimental direction. Moholy-Nagy,
famous for his own photography,
stressed the role of light in creating
space, tracking and defining

Light Volume, Chicago 1937
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motion, as a symbol of life itself.
Lerner was one of the first students, and formed the Light
Workshop. In the 1937 Light Volume, simple elements were placed
in a black box, and lit to create
depth and volume--space itself.
There was much talk about the
space-time concept; at the time it
was mysterious , but only thirtytwo years later it would take us to
the moon.

Lerner photographed patterns and rhythms in such images
as Cakes in Window, 1937, but is
perhaps most closely identified
with a theme that continues to
appear in his current work-the act
of seeing itself, process and symbol, characterized by the Eye. He
experimented with mirrors that
combined images, textures on
skin, other single negative collages. A human eye amid barbed

wire, an eye in a bed of nails, for
instance, were powerful pacifist
images as World War II loomed. It
is difficult today to imagine the
impact that a tight close-up such
as Closed Eye had in 1940. Closeups are now a norm in advertising
imagery, but at the time this photograph appeared it had a stunningly new quality. In Lerner's
work the eye as symbol is found
everywhere, an archetype. The

Paper and String, Chicago 1938
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Eye on Window, New York 1943

20

The Cresset

classic Eye on Window, 1943, resurfaced again and again, as in The
Shopping Bag, taken in 1976 on
the Tokyo subway.
The school, by this time
known as The Institute of Design,
was on the leading edge of both
design and photography, and contributed to the acceptance of photography as a serious art form .
Lerner, who both taught at the
school and was its Dean of Stu-

dents, had his first one-man show
in 1973, forty years after beginning his work as a photographer.
Though the current fashion is to
become a "Star" as quickly as possible, surely the art that matters is
mature art.
During the last decade Lerner has frequently photographed in
Japan, evoking abstract forms or
such "found collages" as Mishima,
1978. Fragments of many posters

rotting away reveal Mishima in his
military uniform, worn in his
famous suicide. Lerner's photograph reveals Mishima's lingering
presence, recognizing its synthesis
with other elements, making us
see it for the first time. And we
have returned to the idea of the
artist ever renewing and reinventing his art.

The Shopping Bag, Tokyo 1976
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Letter from
Ireland
Albert R. Trost
Ireland looks great! It is
green (tending to brown this summer because of the unusual heat
and drought, but still greener
than anything we are used to) and
uncrowded. Better than almost
any other place in Europe it has
preserved its natural heritage, and
lacking the experience of modern
full-scale war that has afflicted
much of the rest of Europe, its old
buildings are fairly well preserved
as well. From medieval castles and
religious sites through Georgian
residences in Dublin and Cork, to
the less glamorous reminders of
its Victorian industrial past, there
is plenty of Irish tradition on view.
If one is satisfied with public transportaion and accomodations in
bed-and-breakfasts, travel in Ireland is something of a bargain. It
should be swarming with tourists.
It is not
What is true of tourism is
generally true of the Irish econo-

AI Trost writes regularly for The
Cresset on national affairs, but in
this issue he writes from Ireland as a
"moderately well-informed tourist."
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my as a whole. A bright and
scenic surface conceals a grimmer
reality. This summer Ireland and
the rest of Western Europe are
abuzz with talk of 1992 and the
prospect of greater European
unity and prosperity. However,
almost twenty years of membership in the Common Market has
brought Ireland little more than
greater subsidies for its farmers. A
one-time tourist, in Ireland for a
week or two, would be favorably
impressed with scenery that looks
every bit as good as it does on
those Irish calendars, and with the
optimism of this talk about 1992.
The reality is a country which a
newsmagazine titles, "the poorest
of the rich."
Of the twelve nations in
the European Community or
Common Market, Ireland has the
third lowest per capita GNP. Only
Portugal and Greece are lower.
Of the richest--the northern
nations-Ireland is the poorest by
this measure. Among the nations
of the European Community, only
Spain has a higher unemployment
rate than Ireland's percent. As a
proportion of its GNP, Ireland has
the biggest public debt of the
twelve nations.
It would be hard to convince the casual tourist, or many
Irish-Americans who have never
visited their country of ancestry,
that this is the actual state of
affairs. I do not know of another
European country so misperceived by Americans. The popular
image of Ireland in America
seems to consist of equal parts of
calendar photographs by Jill and
Leon Uris and boistrous good
times in Chicago bars on St.
Patrick's Day.
To explain why the reality
is so different would take a book,
but in the confines of a letter, I
can give two important factors in

Ireland's economic failure. One is
obvious to the arm-chair peruser
of a European atlas, the other
requires lengthier acquaintance
with Ireland's history and its people. To treat the obvious first, Ireland is an island fairly far removed
from the continent of Europe.
Though Britain is only a few hours
away by ship, reaching France
requires a long day's journey. The
whole island of Ireland contains
about five million people: one and
a half million are in Northernlreland (a part of the United Kingdom) and three and a half million
are in the Republic of which we
are speaking. That is simply not
enough people to sustain an internal market for many products,
and Ireland is far enough away
from other markets to make transportation costs a major factor. It
simply costs more than goods are
worth to import and export them,
and Ireland's high labor costs do
not make it immediately attractive
to manufacturers as a base for
their operations.
The second factor is Ireland's recent history of anti-colonial struggle. Ireland lives next
door to its former colonial master,
from which it broke away in a bitter conflict only seventy years ago.
Because of the proximity, Ireland
has more of a struggle for its own
identity and pride than most new
nations, and this consequent anticolonialism determines much
Irish policy. To further its own
identity, the Irish government
encourages writing and speaking
in Gaelic. Most official signs in Ireland are in English and Gaelic,
and every student must study the
language in school, and pass an
examination in it for entrance to
the universities. The struggle for
a separate identity has also determined the Irish foreign policy,
which is non-alignment. Because

The Cresset

Britain belonged to NATO, Ireland felt it could not join. Ireland
also tends to side with Third
World non-aligned nations in the
United Nations. These policies
have relatively minor price tags,
especially the Gaelic language
instruction, but they are not the
main economic consequence of
Ireland's colonial legacy.
In fact, the major problem for Ireland has been that,
since the early 1950s, it has tried
with all its government's might to
enjoy the same lifestyle as its former master, but without the same
inheritance of industrial investment and natural resources. What
public and private sectors had
managed together in Britain, Ireland attempted to do with government spending alone. It tried to
emulate Britian's welfare state. To
do this, the Irish government overborrowed and over-taxed. Today
Ireland has Western Europe's
highest standard value-added tax,
its highest income tax on average
citizens, and close to the highest
excise duties and corporation tax.
The average single male with no
allowances would have almost 66
percent of his pay deducted on
income over $15,000. Employers
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also have to pay to support a high
level of Irish social services. The
cost of doing business, or of working in Ireland is simply too high.
Businesses leave, and so do workers, especially those with the highest earning potential.
If one overlooks the faults
in its financing, Ireland has been
fairly successful in emulating
Britain's social services. The products of its educational system compare favorably with Western European nations. Its unemployment
benefits are so good that they are
practically a disincentive to find
regular employment. In the past,
there have also been generous
subsidies for rural housing, and
thus, for the most part, houses in
rural Ireland look great, certainly
on a par with lower middle class
suburbia in the United States.
The prosperous look of the countryside, and the well-educated
young people the tourist is likely
to meet in hotels and restaurants,
make for a good surface appearance. Government spending has
produced impressive-looking
results.
The city of Cork, second
largest in the Republic, is representative of Ireland's assets and its

liabilities. The "beautiful city by
the Lee" lives up to its reputation.
Well-scrubbed public buildings
and churches, most from the 19th
and 20th centuries, line the banks
of both branches of the River Lee
from the town center. The main
streets are broad and clean, like
those in Paris, crowded with people and lined with shops and
banks. There is new construction-shops, offices, public buildingsgoing on. The only real skyscraper in Cork stands alone on the city
limits and is the county government building. So the city is handsome and attractive, but its looks
do not suggest the over 20 percent
unemployment rate. Three major
industrial companies have left the
city recently: Ford, Sunbeam, and
Dunlop. There have been no comparable replacements. Cork does
have two breweries and a distillery,
but their products go only to an
Irish market. Only a few gypsy-like
"travelling people" suggest poverty, but in material terms, Ireland is
poor. In contrast to its colorful,
bright landscape and its friendly,
open people, Ireland's economy
could use some cheer.
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under this Texas statute:

The First
Amendment
and the Flag
Bruce Berner
The Supreme Court's flagdesecration decision, Texas v. johnson, has set off a storm of reaction:
articles decrying the decision as
an outrage; calls for curative legislation and/or constitutional
amendment and/or impeachment;general harrumphing. My
main objective is to locate the flagburning issue within the basic
structure of freedom-of-expression
analysis and sharpen the question;
my subsidiary objective is to argue
briefly that the decision was correct
Gregory John son, as a
participant in an anti-Reagan,
anti-nuclear protest during the
1984 Republican Convention in
Dallas, burned an American flag
while singing, "America, the red,
white, and blue, we spit on you."
Official response to this delightfully crafted composition-in sonata
form,
no
doubt-remains
unknown, but the flagburning
prompted criminal prosecution

Bruce Berner teaches in the School
of Law at Valparaiso University. The
Cresset welcomes him as a new contilr
utor to "The Nation. "
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Desecration of Venerated Object:
(a) A person commits an
offense if he intentionally or knowingly desecrates:
(1) a public monument;
(2) a place of worship or burial;
or
(3) a state or national flag.
(b) For purposes of this section,
"desecrate" means deface, damage, or
otherwise physically mistreat in a way
that the actor knows will seriously
offend one or more persons likely to
observe or discover his action.
His conviction was reviewed by the
Supreme Court, which held, 5-4,
that the statute's application to
Johnson violated the first-amendment protection of expression.
The decision was neither
"a departure from 200 years of history" nor "inevitable," as characterized by two nationally syndicated columnists from opposite ends
of the political spectrum. The
Court had never ruled squarely on
the issue, though dicta assuming
the government's power to so regulate appeared in judicial opinions of such well-credentialed civil
libertarians as Earl Warren, Hugo
Black, and Abe Fortas. On the
other hand, leading constitutional
law authorities (John Hart Ely of
Stanford and Laurence Tribe of
Harvard, among others) state that
flag-desecration statutes can only
with great torture be made to fit
with first-amendment principles as
they are currently designed.
Nevertheless, had the 5-4
decision gone the other way, it
need not have compromised firstamendment jurisprudence generally because the Court could treat
the flag as sui generis, an absolutely
special case, standing (flying?)
alone. Placing the flag in a class
by itself would preserve other first-

amendment doctrines against the
axiom, "hard cases make bad law."
But such a special exception, if
unaccompanied by principled support, preserves coherence only by
admitting incoherence. A constitutional amendment exempting
flag desecration from first-amendment protection would, of course,
achieve the result its proponents
desire. But it would not produce
theoretical coherence unless the
discourse of public or ratification
debate articulated some larger
principle which could explain and
accommodate both the first
amendment and the flag amendment Nothing in the dissenting
opinion suggests this larger principle other than a tour de force that
the flag is "special" or "unique". It
is a very special, unique, revered
symbol, but this does not begin to
explain why it should be placed
outside the first amendment.
Indeed, many believe that a large
part of the flag's uniqueness is the
majestic, calm assurance with
which it tolerates bitter dissent
At the heart of protection
for expression lies the notion that,
on balance, it is best to expose all
ideas, however contemptible, to
the open air of "the marketplace
of ideas." Rather than imprison
those who speak the thought we
hate, this marketplace will often
drive them into ideological
bankruptcy, can render them, in
Justice Douglas's words, "the miserable merchants of unwanted
wares." And while we do not shut
up Gregory Johnson, neither do
we still the voice of Copernicus.
Speaking in the 1943 decision
banning compulsory flag salute,
the Court, through Justice Jackson, stated: "If there is any fixed
star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism,
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religion, or other matters of opinion." Several years later at the
Nuremberg trials, Justice Jackson
would get a close look at a regime
which followed a different star.
The following brief and oversimplified summary of the structure of first-amendment analysis
might help to locate the flagburning issue and, incidentally, to distinguish other issues often
invoked (sometimes erroneously)
in the recent literature. The following hypothetical regulations
are employed to demonstrate the
structure. Assume that each is violated by a defendant through
expressive or communicative
speech or conduct.
A. No writing communist slogans on the Washington Monument.
B. No writing anything on the
Washington Monument.
C. No burning draft cards.
(Assume a draft in effect)
D. No loud noises in residential areas.
E. No passing out handbills.
F. No false advertising.
G. No burning the American
flag in public or private.
Governmental regulation
can abridge expression in either
of two ways. First, a regulation
may be aimed at the communicative impact of ideas or information because the regulator does
not like either the content or
effect of their dissemination (e.g.,
Regulation A). For identification,
we shall call these direct regulations of expression. Second, a regulation may be aimed at conduct's
noncommunicative impact (e.g.,
Regulation D aims at noise abatement, not at the message or its
effect) but nevertheless incidentally abridge communicative opportunity--both the nonexpressing
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teenager with a boombox and the .
expressing electioneer with a
loudspeaker are prohibited by
Regulation D. This is an indirect
regulation of expression.
In cases of indirect regulation, the Court essentially balances the benefit of the regulation
(quiet neighborhoods) against the
incremental costs to expression
(the electioneer must get the
word out in other ways); but,
because first-amendment interests
are involved, the balance is conducted, in Professor Kalven's colorful phrase, "with a thumb on
the scale" in favor of expression.
Notwithstanding the "thumb,"Regulation D has been found constitutional; likewise, Regulation B (no
writing anything on the Washington Monument) properly preserves a unique national landmark
and avoids the cost and trouble of
sandblasting or other repair even
though it removes a channel for
communication, be it "Down with
the Government" or "Patti loves
Johnny." The Court upheld Regulation C (no burning draft cards)
only upon a showing that the
destruction of cards, whether
done publicly for expressive purposes or privately, hampered the
administrative effectiveness of the
Selective Service System.
Not surprisingly, the
Court views direct regulation with
much more suspicion. Although
the first amendment is not "absolute" in even these cases (witness
defamatory speech or falsely
shouting "Fire!" in a crowded theater), the governmental interest in
the regulation must be powerful
or "compelling" to support it, as
with speech carrying a "clear and
present danger" of inciting to riot.
To extend Kalven's metaphor, the
Court calls on itself, in direct regulation cases, to stand on the scale
in favor of expression. (This is

another good reason not to
appoint judicial lightweights.)
Regulation A (no writing communist slogans on the Washington
Monument) could not pass
muster. Note that it explicitly regulates a particular brand of political expression. What legitimate
interest does the Government
have to keep "Hooray for Stalin"
off the monument that would not
also seek to exclude ''To Hell with
the Mets"? Regulation B (no writing anything on the Washington
Monument), the indirect regulation discussed earlier, would constitutionally prohibit both inscriptions even though it is aimed at
neither but at preserving government property against vandalism.
Regulation F (no false advertising), while directly aimed at the
effect of disseminated information, has obvious compelling justification. Moreover, though commercial speech is protected, it is
political expression which is at the
core of the first amendment.
This two-track analytical
structure raises a complicating feature: since scrutiny is much less
stringent in indirect- regulation
cases, regulators might try to disguise a direct regulation as indirect. Some have argued that this
occurred in the draft-card-burning case, that physical integrity of
the cards had nothing to do with
the smooth functioning of the system but was a subterfuge to suppress unorthodox expression during the Vietnam War. Regulation
E (no passing out handbills)
might be advanced as an anti-litter
regulation (indirect), but context
and timing could indicate it is
aimed at particular persons with
particular messages (direct).
Regulation G (no burning
the American flag in public or private), one of the proposed legislative reactions to the Johnson deci-
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sion, is instructive. If its motivation were perceived as a subterfuge for direct regulation of
abhorrent expressive conduct
(and, come on, what else is it?), it
is controlled by Johnson and,
therefore, unconstitutional. If,
alternatively, we naively took the
proponents at their word and
accepted the regulation as protecting "the physical integrity of the
cloth and emblem even against its
owner from destruction of any
kind, public or private, expressive
or not," we would have to concede
that it is only an indirect regulation aimed not at expression but
at preserving this cloth. So far, so
good. But, the moment the regulation is applied against an expressive flagburning, the Court must
weigh the expression interest
(together with thumb) against the
interest in this cloth. But how
weighty is the government's interest in preventing people from
burning their own flags in the privacy of their own homes? Is it
afraid we'll run out and forget
how to make more? This "interest" sounds like H.L. Mencken's
definition of Puritanism : "The
haunting fear that somebody,
somewhere, is doing something
naughty."
The Government may, of
course, clearly prohibit any defacing of particular flags, like the
ones on the Capitol or Fort
McHenry, to preserve historical
relics or merely to defend its own
property. And surely the theft
statute covers stealing or vandalizing others' flags. These regulations aim at any kind of misuse,
expressive or not
The Texas desecration
statute is clearly a direct regulation of expression. The dissenting
justices and the State of Texas concede that it does not apply to closet flagburnings but only to those
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public ones which "seriously
offend" others. It is not sufficient,
therefore, to argue that the interest in preserving the flag's dignity
outweighs the interest in permitting this form of expression. However offensive and gratuitous the
message of the flagburner is (and
Texas concedes that Johnson was
engaged in symbolic expression),
the government must state a
"compelling" justification for stifling it
When the Court engages
in this stand-on-the-scale balancing of direct regulation, the
strength, appropriateness, or value of the expression is not relevant All expression has the same
constitutional weight-to evaluate
it is to miss the whole point. Of
course Johnson's expressive conduct was offensive, gratuitous,
even heartbreaking. The dissent
evokes this well with reference to
the rich history and meaning of
the flag-Francis Scott Key, Iwo
Jima, parades, even the entire text
of Whittier's "Barbara Frietchie":
"Shoot if you must, this old grey
head, But spare your country's
flag .... " What really upsets us is
that Johnson is co-opting the flag
for his own purposes. Most of us
believe him insensitive and wrong.
Say so. Tell one another. Tell him.
Tell him why. The cure is more
speech, not less.
The Court next analyzed
the governmental purposes for
this direct regulation. The State
of Texas advanced two: preventing
breaches of the peace; and preserving the flag as a symbol of
nationhood and national unity.
As to the first, Texas already has a
"disturbing-the-peace" statute and,
at any rate, the demonstration was
in all respects peaceful. As to the
second, burning a flag makes the
flag no less a symbol of nationhood. And why should Americans

be interested in national unity
produced by compulsion? The
profound thrill at parades is not
that everyone stands when the flag
passes, but that everyone wants to
stand.
Beyond that, long before
Johnson desecrated the flag, we
have trivialized it-on candy bars,
advertisements, litter bags
announcing "Smith for Alderman", and so on. And some desecrate the flag by wrapping themselves in it. All of this makes it difficult to accord "compelling"
weight to the unique-symbol argument. It is simply not enough that
flag desecration makes us feel
awful.
None of this is to say that
Johnson did not minimize the flag
or our reverence for it He meant
to and he did. The people who
claim hurt and outrage are not all
posturing and cannot be responsibly dismissed as unenlightened.
The first-amendment guarantee,
like freedom itself, is not free. It
en tails real, painful costs, and
some people bear more than their
fair share. That we must pay these
costs is a sad truth; history records
that the failure to pay them
reveals sadder ones.
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Corrections:
The Editor regrets that footnote
numbers were omitted from the
text ofJon Pahl's article on antinomianism in the September Cresset.
Readers who would like to know
for certain where the footnotes
were placed are invited to request
a corrected copy of the article.
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The Catholic
Moment
A Critique
Paul P. Kuenning
Editor's Note: In October 1988,
The Cresset published an article on The
Catholic Moment by Terry Hall. Paul

Kuenning responds to the same book
here, and we print his remarks as an
extension of that conversation in
which author Neuhaus plays so vital a
part.

The Catholic Moment: The Paradox of the Church in the Postmodem
World (Harper and Row, 1987) by
the Lutheran theologian, Richard
John Neuhaus, is a volume in
praise of the Catholicism represented by Pope John Paul II and
Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, head
of the Vatican 's sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith.
It is at the same time a protest
against Liberation theology and its
liberal allies. Neuhaus is unques-

Paul Kuenning is a retired Lutheran
pastor who has written frequently for
religious journals. His book, The Rise
and Fall of American Pietism was
published in 1988 by Mercer University Press.
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tionably a competent and widelyread scholar of modern Catholicism. His witty, penetrating and
provocative analysis provides a
well-written and readable book.
Lutherans do not often
write about the unique leadership
role of Catholicism. Still it is not
surprising that a neo-conservative
Lutheran clergyman who calls for
a return to tradition and orthodoxy within his own Church, and
who stridently opposes what he
refers to as the mainline liberalism
of his own and other Protestant
denominations, should staunchly
affirm a similar neo-conservative
movement within the Catholic
Church. Like Cardinal Ratzinger,
who was once a progressive theologian and extremely active in
the organization of Vatican II,
Neuhaus was heavily involved in
the liberal causes of the 1960's
and the early 1970's. Both have
turned with a fervor seemingly
fueled by the ferocity of their conversion to a conservatism which
views the growing activist agenda
of their respective Church bodies
with sincere alarm.
The Catholic Moment
further clarifies why Neuhaus has
championed rapprochement with
Rome as an ecumenical priority
for Lutherans. He is convinced
that the Roman Catholicism of
Pope John Paul II and Cardinal
Ratzinger (with emphasis on the
latter) represents the best, if not
the last, hope for the whole
Church of Christ in the postmodern world. As one who remains a
good Lutheran, Neuhaus professes this strand of Catholicism to
approximate the pure traditions
of the Reformation more closely
than any other group within Christendom. He believes this to be so
in large part because it insists over
against both Liberation theology
and mainstream Protestant liberal-

ism that the Church and the world
must be viewed as existing in a
paradoxical relationship to one
another. That this point is pivotal
to the thesis which Neuhaus develops can be seen in the subtitle of
his book: The Paradox of the Church
in the Postmodern World. The meaning of this concept of the "Church
and the world in paradox" is by
the author's own admission nearly
identical to that of the orthodox
Lutheran concept of the "two-fold
rule of God" or the doctrine of
the Two Kingdoms. (p. 22 and p.
213) It is a theology which
denounces Liberationists and
their allies for what it perceives as
their unqualified limitation of the
Gospel to purely human and
earthly concerns. This inadequate
and severely curtailed concept of
Liberation theology serves as a foil
for the orthodoxy which Neuhaus
champions.
In describing what he
calls the "core" ofjohn Paul's "liberationist revisionism" Neuhaus
claims that the Pope "has
launched a fundamental challenge to the habit of mind that
pits the infinite against the finite,
other-worldliness against thisworldliness, the eternal against
the temporal." But the very next
sentence indicates that the pontiff
may have reinforced this mind set
rather than challenged it. What
the Pope means, Neuhaus writes,
is that "the political is urgent, but
it is not ultimate." He then goes
on to say that the political "is
derived from, and participates in
the ultimate, but must never be
equated with the ultimate." (pp.
228-229) Whatever else is meant
by this arcane point of logic, its
effect is more surely to set the
eternal above the temporal, rather
than draw them together.
The eternal (suprahistorical) is unquestionably of ultimate
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importance in the long run. But
the temporal (historical) has a
short term ultimacy of its own. The
sure End provides sustenance for
the equivocal present. But the
source and goal of life can never
be separated in any qualitative
manner from its present expression without violating the Biblical
witness. As in Christ, the transcendent and immanent aspects of the
Godhead are inseparable. While
the Gospels record Jesus as pointing to the perfection of heaven as
the final goal toward which we
journey, they indicate at the same
time that his most urgent concern
was centered in the immediate
needs and decisions of daily life.
He professed not even to know
the exact time the Eschaton would
arrive. He directed his followers
to "watch" and went on to describe
the nature of that "watching" as
the faithful performance of one's
daily tasks. The clear implication
is that the temporal has more
urgency than the eternal,
although not more importance.
To deprive the present historical
moment of ultimate significance,
as The Catholic Moment proposes, is
to separate the creation from the
Creator, to deny the indissolvable
connection between the finite and
the eternal, the kingdom in heaven and on earth. It is, in a word,
to put asunder that which God has
joined together.
Those who seek to keep
the temporal and the eternal united, and who therefore view themselves as instruments through
which God establishes partial
approximations of the heavenly
kingdom on earth, are branded in
The Catholic Moment as "enthusiasts" who "try to force into existence that pure community"
rather than being content "to live
within the paradox." Neuhaus
quotes a phrase Cardinal

28

Ratzinger used to describe the
impatience of those who refuse to
live within the paradox when he
refers to "the temptation to premature closure ...a synonym for
what used to be called 'triumphalism."' (p. 45) This "premature
synthesis" by those who want to
"get it altogether and to do so
now" is later described as idolatry.
(p. 185) Here the sharpest possible contention is leveled against
the emphasis in liberal and Liberationist theology on the Biblical
vision of God's kingdom on earth.
Neuhaus's basic definition
of living within the paradox is to
"live by faith." (pp. 32-33) What
he fails to perceive is that this living by faith might be described
more realistically as accepting
things as they are, living with the
status quo in the serene confidence that all wrongs will be righted in the coming Parousia. In this
sense "living with the paradox"
can be very comforting to the
minority of humankind who are
presently quite comfortable, but it
contains little that is uplifting to
the poor, oppressed, and suffering
majority.
Throughout his book
Neuhaus maintains that the crucial question which faces the
Church until our Lord's return is
that which Jesus poses in Luke
18:8: "when the Son ofMan comes
will he find faith on earth?" It is a
vital query to be sure, but critical
to its answer is one's definition of
"faith." What constitutes the full
reality of faith? Can it be confmed
to an inner affirmation, a verbal
confession of belief in a transcendental reality, or must it include as
an indissoluble aspect of its fullness a practical love expressed to
one's neighbor, and particularly to
the one most in need? It was this
latter definition of faith which permeated a lengthy treatise on this

verse of scripture by the Lutheran
Pietist, Philip Spener, which he
entitled "A Hope for Better Times
in the Church." Spener concluded
that if faith is found when the Son
of Man returns, there will be also
be found a better Church and a
better world. By thus describing
faith as inextricably intertwined
with love, justification with sanctification, Spener and German
Lutheran Pietism in general simply made more explicit a theological emphasis that Luther
expressed but never fully developed, and which Lutheran orthodoxy quickly annihilated. The
Catholic Moment follows in the
footsteps of that orthodoxy.
Neuhaus contends, however, that it is only a proper balance between eternal and temporal concerns which he and the
neo-conservative Catholic leadership seek to restore. His argument, as noted earlier, is that the
scale has been drastically tipped in
the direction of the earthly,
human, practical and particularly
the political, and away from the
spiritual and the transcendental.
He claims that what he calls "the
Catholic moment" challenges this
"imperiousness of the political."
(p. 286)

If Neuhaus is really only
concerned about the restoration
of a proper emphasis, and not the
delineation of a qualitative distinction between eternal and temporal concerns, then surely it is
unnecessary to level anathemas at
those with whom he disagrees.
Once it is accepted that both of
these matters are integral aspects
of an indivisible whole, then why
not encourage individual persons
and groups to emphasize one or
the other as they are inclined and
inspired to do? As St. Paul writes,
there are varieties of gifts and service but the same Lord and Spirit.
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But Neuhaus is not
inclined toward that degree of
leniency. He remains the heresy
hunter. He labels a Church
and/or Church leaders who take
sides on "political issues" as "partisan" and proceeds to condemn a
"partisan Church as an apostate
Church." (p. 287) It is ironic that
Neuhaus expresses his fierce
opposition to a "partisan Church"
in such a fiercely partisan manner.
Neuhaus contends the "Biblical
politics" of the liberal theology
which he opposes places its followers "somewhere between the Jesse
Jackson wing of the Democratic
party and the Juan Luis Segundo
wing of liberation theology." That
observation may well be correct,
but his following comment that
such "unconscious partisanship is
more frequent on the Left than
on the Right," (p. 276) is both gratuitous and erroneous. As an
astute political observer Neuhaus
is certainly aware that his own
neo-conservatism locates his
adherents somewhere between the
Bush-Reagan wing of the Republican party and the Cardinal
Ratzinger wing of Catholicism. In
all fairness, his capable opponents
are equally aware of where they
stand on the political spectrum.
What Neuhaus portrays as
criticism of the so-called "theology
of the left"is true of every theological position. Each can be assigned
to a particular place on the scale
of partisan politics, which is only
another way to say that Neuhaus's
option for a non-partisan Church
is pure fantasy. His insight that it
is better to be aware of one's partisanship is accurate, but it turns
out to be a stinging criticism of his
own position. With a curious
inconsistency and lack of logic, he
fails to consider that the Church
which remains silent on critical
political issues is giving implicit
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consent to the powers that be, and
therefore acting in a partisan
manner on behalf of the status
quo.
In his rejection of a partisan Church, Neuhaus has nevertheless touched upon important
truths . He is right that the
Church must never identifY itself
in any permanent sense with a
particular political party or ideology. This is so, as he indicates,
because all political parties and
ideologies have only a partial
application to life's fullness, and
yet they tend to absolutize themselves. But this valid insight should
not itself be absolutized, as
Neuhaus tends to do. Occasions
arise when for a limited time, in
order to stand with the specific
needs of the poor, the powerless
and the oppressed, it may be necessary for the Church not only to
speak out on the issues but actually to endorse a particular candidate, office-holder, party or ideology. This should be done only
where the human need is urgent,
where the Biblical injunctions are
imperative, and where the support
of the Church is crucial to a successful outcome. Once this specifi c goal is accomplished, the
Church can once again resume its
prophetic role of critical support
and/or resistance to the political
party in power. An actual example
of this kind of participation and
cons e quent withdrawal can be
seen in the Church's varying positions during the recent revolution
in Nicaragua.
So long as the Church as
an institution wields political influence it is an illusion to believe that
it can be non-partisan . If being
partisan is to be contaminated, it
is better to "sin boldly" than piously to protest that we are isolated
from any ideological bias. As a liberati on theologian once para-

phrased a word of Jesus, "Let him
who is without ideology cast the
first stone." In the long run, the
Church will solve its problem of
unity within the fellowship of
believers not by seeking for a
place of political neutrality; such a
place does not exist. Rather, it
must courageously allow for the
expression of differing viewpoints
as part of the arduous process of
determining which precise political stands should be taken.
Neuhaus attempts to alleviate the obvious cant contained
in his call for a non-partisan
Church by stressing the need for
the laity to be involved in politics.
Religious leaders and the Church
as a corporate body are to remain
strictly "neutral" while fulfilling
their true "spiritual" role, which is
to equip the laity to achieve their
Christian vocation through
(among other things) political
involvement. Everything which
Neuhaus has to say about the
equipment of the saints "for the
exercise of their ministry in the
public arena" (p. 286) as a primary teaching role of the Church is
on target. The problem is that he
sets it over against any participation by the corporate Church in
political advocacy.
How can the Church fulfill a proper teaching mission to
its individual members in their
vocational task while it ignores its
corporate vocation as an advocate
for the poor and the oppressed?
How can Church leaders
pompously instruct the laity about
political involvement as a vital
aspect of the life to which God has
called them and at the same time
disregard the prophetic elements
of their own God-given vocation?
The either-or dichotomy evident
in the call for individual-lay participation and corporate-clerical
exclusion from the political realm
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characterizes the general theological approach which Neuhaus
advocates. It is God talk over
against human activity, rather than
spirituality issuing forth in
activism. It is the grace of God
over against an 'insipid moralism,"
rather than faith becoming active
in love. As a result the dogmatic
and sanctimonious religiosity
which Neuhaus defends is more
vulnerable to criticism than the socalled "humanistic moralism"
which he condemns.
For the most part, The
Catholic Moment presents able and
challenging arguments on behalf
of the neo-conservative, anti-liberation theology which it defends.
This cannot be said, however, for
the author's repeated refrain that
political involvement of the
Church spells institutional disaster, which can be seen in loss of
membership and funding by its
disgruntled constituents. This
warning is reinforced with numerous statistical data recording the
declines in membership and religious vocations over the past number of years by churches meddling
in politics. (pp. 191 and 263-264)
It is really inexplicable
that a writer with the acumen that
Neuhaus otherwise demonstrates

descends to a level of analysis
which scarcely deserves the name
of theology. The test of the
Church's real health is not based
on the measure of its institutional
growth, but on obedience to its
God-given mission. If one takes
the Biblical witness seriously then
growth in membership and material assets, far from being the ultimate test of faithfulness to the
Gospel, might possibly be the
measure of its apostasy. The chief
characteristic of a prophetic
proclamation of the Gospel has
never been popularity, particularly
with its comfortable middle class
and wealthy members. The real
test of the Church's vitality may
now, as in every age, be the willingness to lose in order to gain, to
die in order to live again. That
truth has in fact been recently
demonstrated in Latin America
where the Catholic Church has
experienced the leaven of vitality
in the poor with whom it has identified.
It is precisely where the
membership of mainstream
churches is primarily middle and
upper class, and where the poor
and working classes are largely
excluded that the membership
loss which Neuhaus ascribes to a

"partisan church" has taken place.
Incredibly, what Neuhaus has chosen to proclaim as a 'prophetic
warning is that the great, white
middle class and not-so-silent
majority whom he calls the "real
Church," and whom he claims feel
"implicitly excommunicated" by
"partisan politics from the pulpit,"
(p. 268) are going to cut back on
their offerings and shake the dust
from their feet in protest. Granted that this sort of warning is
guaranteed to capture the attention of an institutionalized
Church often motivated more by
fear of material losses than by real
dedication to the needs of suffering and oppressed humanity,
there is little more that can be said
for it Most certainly it is devoid of
any theological validity.
The Catholic Moment is a
highly politicized defense of
Catholic-Lutheran neo-conservatism. Unfortunately, the force
of its argument is severely debilitated by the author's pious pretention that the theological position
he espouses remains above politics.
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The Slow Learners Get
Shoes for School
Three sisters, they've come with their mother
To get ready for school, and my son fits them.
He brushes their ankles and speaks of leather
Lasting, the waterproof strength of stitching.
The mother listens like someone who's learned
To hear the sense in babble. She's watching
Her daughters and counting up their comfort
When they stand, when they stumble unbalanced
By this change in size, all suddenly laughing
At the silly steps around them while my son
Says "How do they feel?" "There's the mirror"
And they begin a dance, shuffle and skip like
They're breaking them in, like they've been bought
And carried home in boxes that surprise them
Again in the kitchen where their mother will
Watch them cakewalk their share of the source
Of dance that lurches and glides, pivots and slides.
My son is speaking to the mother; he's offering
"Cinderella" and "Dorothy," and she answers,
"The three little kittens have found their mittens,"
And he tries to remember their names and fails,
And thinks, in his storybook, they had no tails.

Gary Fincke
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